2010年11月12日星期五

正当优先于善

网上一直有个好玩的现象,一些舆论红人会同时受到来自“上”“下”两边的批评。“上面”的意思是,批评者确实知道问题在哪,是事实还是逻辑(抑或两者)出了问题。甚至,批评者自己就走过那个阶段("been there before"),犯过那些错误,所以看得更加明白。所谓“下面”,是说有些人其实不清楚被批评者在说什么或针对什么在说,不理解对方关注的是什么、思考过什么,说直接一点,就是比被批评者水平还低得多,但也装模作样地和前者一起向被批评者伸出手指。在这样同时被恰当地和不恰当地批评的行列里,有南周,有铅笔社,也有刘瑜。

刘瑜在GQ上写了篇专栏,批评有些人没有底线。作为一篇没有过多涉及学理的时评,问题不大。但很快就有人抬杠,说食人族怎么算呢,“底线”之说碰上这个肯定晕菜了吧。其实这个反问没什么意义。因为刘瑜说的是(非国家紧急状态下)折磨、杀害活人——“把倪玉兰、孙志刚、魏文华打残打死”,跟人死后食其肉的殡葬习俗根本两码事。批评者继续举出穆斯林女人必须裹头巾之类的例子来反驳(共同)“底线”说。其实这恰恰暴露出其缺乏最起码的政治哲学素养,也过分低估了刘瑜——政治学博士会没有思考过这些问题?就算她没有自己动脑子想过,肯定也按要求看过相关的阅读材料吧。

“底线”说完全可以在道德哲学上得到支撑。换句话说,至少在一种正义理论中,有些事情没有价值,不是善。这种正义理论主张正当优先于善,即社会除了维持正义之外不能要求人们服从某种特定的善,将最大化这种善作为全社会的目标;另外,为了维持正义,个人某些欲望的满足必须被排除在善的范围之外。既然这里提到了“一种正义理论”,读者应该都会想到罗尔斯的《正义论》(A Theory of Justice)。我们这就来看看他在第6节里对此是怎么说的:

...In utilitarianism the satisfaction of any desire has some value in itself which must be taken into account in deciding what is right. In calculating the greatest balance ofsatisfaction it does not matter, except indirectly, what the desires are for. We are to arrange institutions so as to obtain the greatest sum of satisfactions; we ask no questions about their source or quality but only how their satisfaction would affect the total of well-being. Social welfare depends directly and solely upon the levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of individuals. Thus if men take a certain pleasure in discriminating against one another, in subjecting others to a lesser liberty as a means of enhancing their self-respect, then the satisfaction of these desires must beweighed in our deliberations according to their intensity, or whatever,along with other desires. If society decides to deny them fulfillment, or to suppress them, it is because they tend to be socially destructive and a greater welfare can be achieved in other ways.

In justice as fairness, on the other hand, persons accept in advance aprinciple of equal liberty and they do this without a knowledge of their more particular ends. They implicitly agree, therefore, to conform their conceptions of their good to what the principles of justice require, or atleast not to press claims which directly violate them. An individual who finds that he enjoys seeing others in positions of lesser liberty understands that he has no claim whatever to this enjoyment. The pleasure he takes in others’ deprivations is wrong in itself: it is a satisfaction which requires the violation of a principle to which he would agree in the original position. The principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on which satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of one’s good. In drawing up plans and in deciding on aspirations men are to take these constraints into account. Hence in justice as fairness one does not take men’s propensities and inclinations as given, whatever they are, and then seek the best way to fulfill them. Rather, their desires and aspirations are restricted from the outset by the principles of justice which specify the boundaries that men’s systems of ends must respect. We can express this by saying that in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good. A just social system defines the scope within which individuals must develop their aims, and it provides a framework of rights and opportunities and the means of satisfaction within and by the use of which these ends may be equitably pursued. The priority of justice is accounted for, in part, by holding that the interests requiring the violation of justice have no value. Having no merit in the first place, they cannot override its claims.

This priority of the right over the good in justice as fairness turns out to be a central feature of the conception. It imposes certain criteria on the design of the basic structure as a whole; these arrangements must not tend to generate propensities and attitudes contrary to the two principles of justice (that is, to certain principles which are given from the first a definite content) and they must insure that just institutions are stable. Thus certain initial bounds are placed upon what is good and what forms of character are morally worthy, and so upon what kinds of persons men should be. Now any theory of justice will set up some limits of this kind, namely, those that are required if its first principles are to be satisfied given the circumstances. Utilitarianism excludes those desires and propensities which if encouraged or permitted would, in view of the situation, lead to a lesser net balance of satisfaction. But this restriction is largely formal, and in the absence of fairly detailed knowledge of the circumstances it does not give much indication of what these desires and propensities are. This is not, by itself, an objection to utilitarianism. It is simply a feature of utilitarian doctrine that it relies very heavily upon the natural facts and contingencies of human life in determining what forms of moral character are to be encouraged in a just society. The moral ideal of justice as fairness is more deeply embedded in the first principles of the ethical theory. This is characteristic of natural rights views (the contractarian tradition) in comparison with the theory of utility.

当然,为免被指为装屄,必须承认,我当初读的是何怀宏等人的中译。只是想到这些段落,欲复制粘贴时,发现只有网上流传的另一译本(王沪宁作序)可用,于是找来英文原版中的这几段,读过确认无误,贴在这里。这一非权威译本的相应段落如下,勉强可看:

……按照功利主义,任何欲望的满足本身都具有某种价值,因而在决定什么是正当时必须把这种价值考虑进去。至于这种欲望是什么,除间接影响外,对计算满足的最大差额是无关紧要的。我们对体制的安排,要以获得满足的最大总量为目的;对于这些满足来自何方,性质如何,我们并不提出任何问题,我们所要问的只是这些欲望的满足将会怎样影响总的福利。社会福利直接地,也是唯一地取决于个人满足与不满足的程度。例如,如果人们以相互歧视为乐,使别人得到较少的自由权作为提高他们的自尊的手段,那我们就必须和对其他欲望一样,根据它们的强烈程度等等,对它们是否应该得到满足,予以审慎的考虑。如果社会决定对这些欲望不予满足,甚或予以压制,那是团为它们对社会具有破坏性倾向,因为更大的福利可以通过其他途径来获得。

另一方面,按照正义即公平理论,人们事先接受了一种平等自由权原则,但他们在这样做时并不了解他们的更具体的目标。因此,他们毫无保留地一致同意使他们的关于善的观念与正义原则的要求相一致,或者至少不去坚持直接违反这些原则的要求。一个以看到别人处于较少自由权地位为乐的人知道,他们没有任何以此为乐的权利。以别人被剥夺为乐,这本身就是错误的:这种满足必然要破坏他在原始状态中可能同意的原则。正当原则,从而正义原则,对于哪些满足才有价值这一点规定了限制;它们对于什么是一个人合理的关于善的观念这一点也规定了限制。人们在制定计划和选择志愿时,必须考虑到这些限制。因此,按照正义即公平理论,不管人的倾向和爱好是什么,人们并不认为它们是既定的东西;然后,人们便去寻找满足它们的最佳办法。更确切地说,他们的欲望或志愿从一开始就受到正义原则的限制,正是这些原则明确规定了人们系统欲望必须尊重的界线。要表明这一点,我们可以这样说:在正义即公平理论中,正当概念优先于关于善的概念。正义的社会制度规定了个人追求自己目标所不能超越的范围,这个制度提供了一系列权利和机会,也提供了满足的手段,遵循这些手段,使用这些手段,就可以公平地去追求这些目标。必须违反原则才能得到的利益是没有任何价值的,坚信这一点,也就部分说明了正义优先。既然这些利益本来就毫无价值可言,它们就不能超越正义的要求。

按照正义即公平观,正当优先于善,这证明是这一观念的主要特征。它对整个基本结构的设计规定了某些标准;这些安排决不可有助于产生违反正义的两个原则(即违反从一开始就被赋予具体内容的原则)的倾向和态度,它们必须保证正义体制的稳定。这就给什么是好的,什么是道德高尚的品格,以及应该做什么样的人,划定了初步界限。不过,任何正义理论都会作出这种限制,即在特定情况下使它的基本原则得到满足所必须有的那些限制。有些欲望和倾向是功利主义拒绝考虑的,因为鼓励或允许这些欲望和倾向,在当时情况下就会产生较小的满足的净差额。但是,这种限制主要是形式上的限制,如果没有对情况的相当详细的了解,它也不能充分表明它们是什么样的欲望和倾向。光是这一点还不能说是功利主义的缺点。在决定哪些道德品质应在一个正义的社会里得到鼓励对严重依赖自然事实和人类生活的偶然因素,这正是功利主义理论的一个特征。正义即公平理论的道德理想是深深地植根于伦理理论的基本原则之中的。同功利理论相比,这正是自然权利观(契约论的传统)的特点。

而这一点,据我理解(I could be wrong),在罗尔斯吸收各种批评后写出的《政治自由主义》里也没有改变。类似地,刘瑜提到的动物的某些权利,也可在某种程度上得到证成,使我们能够合理地说,无论个人喜好如何,虐猫与摘花确有高下之分。当然,道德哲学问题永远都会有争议,如“正当优先于善”就受到桑德尔等人的批评。但毫无疑问的是,这些绝不像某些头脑幼稚者想得那么简单。并且,在批评者自己的理论中,也未必没有类似“底线”之说的存在。毕竟,如果我们要和平而有秩序地生活在一个足够大的社会中,服从一些普遍适用的法律,有些禁忌就无可避免。

1 条评论:

  1. 看到辉格对刘瑜此文的回复,觉得有点没事找事的感觉,我不认为刘瑜是一个普世主义的人,而且普世主义和cultural relativism没有过多的冲突,只是一个构成比例的多少的问题

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